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Abstract: Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) is a policy designed to tax such ‘bads’ 
as resource depletion and pollution and to reduce tax impositions on such 
‘goods’ as labour and income. The aim of ETR is relatively straightforward: 
(1) taxing depletion and pollution should decrease the rate of resource 
throughput per unit of economic activity and relieve any growing pressure on 
the natural environment; (2) reducing tax rates on labour and income should 
encourage the employment of labour and reward value-adding in production. 
For these reasons, many observers believe that ETR has the capacity to deliver 
the double dividend of ecological sustainability and low unemployment. 
Some ecological economists are quite comfortable with the positive 
employment effect of ETR but are not altogether confident that conventional 
ETR measures will result in ecological sustainability. They argue that 
sustainability is essentially a throughput problem, yet market prices – and this 
includes tax-adjusted resource prices – are an allocative instrument with the 
limited capacity to induce greater resource use efficiency. Despite the logical 
benefits of a more efficient allocation of natural resources, ecological 
economists believe that, left unchecked, efficiency gains are likely to be 
overwhelmed by the scale impact of increased economic activity (the ‘Jevons’ 
effect’). As such, tax-adjusted prices cannot prevent the intensity of 
environmental stress from eventually exceeding sustainable limits. To achieve 
ecological sustainability, many ecological economists believe it is necessary for 
an ETR package to include a separate policy instrument in the form of 
quantitative throughput controls that must be based on ecological rather than 
economic criteria. 
With the ecological economic position in mind, this paper reveals the ETR 
performances of four nations – Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, and 
Finland. Using CO2 emissions as an indicator of environmental stress, it 
appears in all four cases that significant efficiency increases have eventuated 
(as represented by the ratio of real GDP to CO2 emissions). The employment 
impact of reduced income and labour taxes is much harder to discern but, 
importantly, total CO2 emissions have either changed very little (Sweden and 
Denmark) or have markedly increased (The Netherlands and Finland). This 
evidence cautiously supports the ecological economic position and raises 
doubts as to whether conventional ETR measures can achieve ecological 
sustainability and, furthermore, the promised double dividend. 
Keywords: ecological tax reform; CO2 emissions; efficiency; Jevons’ effect; 
ecological sustainability. 
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1 Introduction 
The principal aim of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence to support 
the ecological economic position on conventional Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) 
measures – namely, that while they are likely to improve resource use efficiency and 
increase the attractiveness of employing labour, they are unable to guarantee ecological 
sustainability. More to the point, they are unlikely to deliver the double dividend of 
ecological sustainability and low unemployment. 
To support the ecological economic position, empirical evidence is provided of 
the efficiency, employment, and CO2 emissions performances of Sweden, Denmark, 
The Netherlands, and Finland. These four countries have been chosen because they, more 
than any other countries, have come closest to explicitly implementing ETR (Hoerner and 
Bosquet, 2001). All four countries introduced CO2 taxes in the early 1990s – the rates of 
which have since been modified – which were either immediately or later accompanied 
by decreased tax rates on income and/or labour. 
For the purposes of this paper, the efficiency performance of the above four nations 
is reflected by the ratio of real GDP to CO2 emissions. Both the total number of 
people employed and the unemployment rate are used to indicate the employment 
impact of ETR measures, while total CO2 emissions are used as an indicator of 
environmental stress. 
CO2 emissions were the preferred environmental indicator for three reasons. 
Firstly, the environmental element of the ETR packages of all four counties focused 
primarily on subduing CO2 emissions in order to meet Kyoto obligations. Secondly, 
since CO2 emissions are highly correlated to energy consumption and energy is necessary 
to fuel the economic process, total CO2 emissions constitute a good macro indicator 
of a nation’s environmental impact. Finally, climate change – of which CO2 
emissions are the principal cause – is regarded as one of human kind’s most pressing 
environmental dilemmas. 
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2 What is the conventional approach to ETR? 
In conventional terms, ETR involves a policy mix of tax impositions on such ‘bads’ as 
resource depletion and pollution and reduced tax rates on such ‘goods’ as labour and 
income (e.g., see O’Riordan, 1997; Roodman, 1998; Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). In 
most cases, ETR is promoted as a revenue-neutral means of achieving the double 
dividend of ecological sustainability and low unemployment (Daly, 1996; Hoerner and 
Bosquet, 2001). 
How does ETR supposedly deliver the double dividend? Firstly, by taxing resource 
depletion and pollution, ETR proponents believe there is an immediate incentive for 
producers to reduce resource wastage and a long-term incentive to develop and install 
resource-saving technologies. Thus, by reducing the rate of resource throughput per unit 
of economic activity, depletion and pollution taxes are able to alleviate the growing 
pressure that economic activity currently imposes on the natural environment. 
From an employment perspective, conventional ETR proponents believe that reduced 
tax rates on labour and income will encourage the employment of labour and reward 
value-adding in production (Lawn, forthcoming). Moreover, by rewarding better rather 
than more production, ETR advocates believe that reduced tax rates on income can boost 
real wages and thus enable workers to reduce the number of hours spent at work. In turn, 
this can promote job sharing with the unemployed. In all, conventional ETR proponents 
argue that ETR can overcome the common fear that depletion and pollution taxes 
will result in rising unemployment (Bosquet, 2000; Forstater, 2004; Lawn, 2004a; 
Cowling et al., 2006, Victor, forthcoming). 
It is important to recognise, at this point, that conventional ETR measures rely 
entirely on the role that tax-adjusted market prices play in altering the incentives and 
disincentives of producers, consumers, and workers alike to achieve the desired goals of 
ecological sustainability and low unemployment. Clearly, an important assumption 
underlying the success of conventional ETR packages is that ecological sustainability 
can be achieved by internalising the spillover costs of resource depletion and pollution. 
In other words, by ensuring the prices of material goods reflect the marginal social 
cost of production (resource inputs) and consumption (waste outputs), all ensuing 
Pareto-efficient outcomes will be ecologically sustainable. As we shall soon see, it is here 
where some ecological economists depart, not from the concept of ETR itself, but from 
the conventional ETR approach. 
3 What do some ecological economists have to say about conventional 
ETR measures and why? 
3.1 Conventional ETR measures and the Jevons’ effect 
Many ecological economists are quite comfortable with the idea that conventional ETR 
measures can have positive employment implications. As such, they believe that tax 
reductions on income and labour should remain an essential feature of any ETR 
package. However, they are much less confident that conventional ETR measures 
– namely, the depletion and pollution tax element – can bring about ecological 
sustainability. These misgivings stem from the ecological economic argument that  
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sustainability is essentially a throughput problem, yet market prices – and this includes 
tax-adjusted resource prices – are an allocative instrument with the limited capacity to 
induce greater resource use efficiency. 
There is no doubt that a more efficient allocation of natural resources is socially 
desirable with obvious environmental benefits per unit of economic activity. The 
problem, according to ecological economists, is that, in a system devoid of any explicit 
limitation on the rate of resource throughput, efficiency gains are likely to be 
overwhelmed by the scale impact of increased economic activity (the so-called ‘Jevons’ 
effect’). If so, the aggregate rate of resource throughput and any subsequent 
environmental stress will increase rather than diminish. Since the conventional ETR 
approach of tax-adjusted prices does not involve an explicit limitation on the rate of 
resource throughput, conventional ETR measures cannot prevent the intensity of 
environmental stress from eventually exceeding sustainable limits. 
To achieve ecological sustainability, many ecological economists believe it is 
necessary for an ETR package to include a separate policy instrument in the form of 
quantitative throughput controls based on ecological rather than economic criteria (Daly, 
1991; Lawn, 2000; forthcoming). For this reason, ecological economists are very much in 
favour of tradeable resource use and pollution permits – essentially ‘cap and trade’ 
systems – rather than direct depletion and pollution taxes.1 
How do permit systems successfully deal with the sustainability issue? Unlike 
conventional ETR packages, a restriction on the number of permits auctioned by a 
government authority limits the throughput of matter-energy to a rate consistent with 
the regenerative and waste assimilative capacities of the natural environment. This 
immediately resolves the sustainability goal. The revenue raised from the sale of the 
permits can be redistributed to the poor and those directly harmed by depletion/pollution 
activities. This assists in the resolution of society’s equity goals. Finally, the premium 
paid by resource buyers for the limited number of permits – which is determined 
by demand and constrained supply forces in the various resource markets – serves 
as a throughput or absolute scarcity tax to facilitate the efficient allocation of the 
incoming resource flow.2 Hence, permit systems achieve everything that is likely to be 
generated by depletion and pollution taxes except they go one step further and ensure 
ecological sustainability.3 
3.2 Why can tax-adjusted resource prices not achieve ecological sustainability? 
Whether tax-adjusted resource prices can negate the Jevons’ effect and bring about 
ecological sustainability depends essentially on whether they can adequately reflect 
the absolute scarcity of the total resource stock. Ecological economists believe they 
cannot. Their position can be summarised by the following. Firstly, relative prices are 
generated by interacting market demand and supply forces that are essentially flow-based 
forces. By flow-based forces I mean the inflowing quantity of low entropy resources 
demanded at various prices by resource buyers and, on the supply-side, the inflowing 
quantity of the various types and grades of low entropy resources supplied at various 
prices by resource sellers.4 
Secondly, while the stock of a particular resource has some bearing over the 
inflowing quantity being supplied, the supply of a particular incoming flow at any point 
in time is much less restricted than the supply of the same incoming flow over time. For 
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example, if timber suppliers double the quantity of timber supplied to a particular timber 
market, they can continue to do this for some limited period even if the rate of supply 
exceeds the capacity of forests/timber plantations to supply the same quantity of timber 
over time. As for the suppliers of a non-renewable resource, any quantity supplied at a 
particular point in time cannot be continued indefinitely. However, until the stock of the 
resource is close to exhaustion, it is still possible for its short-term supply to be increased. 
Thirdly, in the short-term, when a larger yet unsustainable quantity of a particular 
resource is being supplied, it is possible, at least during the initial depletion phase of the 
resource, for the price-influencing effect of flow-based forces to dominate the stock 
effect. Should this be occurring, the relative price of a dwindling resource will fall not 
rise – as one would expect of the short-run price for crude oil if, for example, OPEC 
countries immediately increased oil production. Would this fall in price be a reflection of 
its declining absolute scarcity? No. It would be a reflection of a higher inflowing quantity 
(declining relative scarcity) at a time when the remaining stock was shrinking (increasing 
absolute scarcity). 
It is true that the stock effect on resource prices must eventually outweigh the flow 
effect since, on the supply-side, resource prices are also influenced by the cost of 
extraction/harvesting. This cost is likely to rise sharply as it becomes increasingly 
difficult to sustain the same inflowing quantity from an ever-diminishing stock. Clearly, 
resource prices must eventually reflect an increase in the absolute scarcity of low entropy 
matter-energy. But there are three main reasons why the conveyance of this information 
in markets is likely to be delayed or not be properly conveyed at all. To begin with, 
resources themselves are required to extract/harvest resources. If the prices of the 
resources used to extract/harvest new resources are understated, so is the cost of 
extraction. This, in turn, understates the cost of future extraction, and so on. Secondly, 
futures markets are imperfect at best and non-existent at worst. Thirdly, where futures 
markets exist, they are designed to capture the stock effect on the future supplies of 
particular resources. For example, if the stock of a particular resource is severely limited, 
so are future supplies. One would expect the price of a rapidly dwindling resource in a 
futures contract to be very high to reflect the shortage of future supplies. While the price 
might well be higher, it is unlikely to be sufficiently high because people have the 
tendency to discount future values, including the cost to future generations of having 
smaller resource stocks. Furthermore, future generations, the very people most likely to 
be adversely affected by increasing resource scarcity, have no way of bidding in the 
present for the future availability of resources. Taken together, these factors may or may 
not threaten the intergenerational efficiency of resource use. However, intergenerational 
efficiency does not guarantee intergenerational equity (sustainability) in the same way 
intragenerational efficiency need not coincide with intragenerational equity (Howarth and 
Norgaard, 1990; Daly, 1991). In all, the price signals generated by resource markets, 
including futures markets, are likely to be ineffective at ensuring natural capital 
maintenance and a sustainable resource flow. 
I might also point out that a recent simulation exercise (Lawn, 2004b) appears to 
theoretically support the ecological economic position on resource prices and resource 
scarcity. Based on a welfare-maximising natural resource model, the exercise suggests 
that the price of an increasingly scarce resource is likely to decline in the initial depletion 
phase. Only as stock-based supply forces eventually overwhelm flow-based supply forces 
does the price of the resource rise rapidly. Importantly, this only occurs once the stock of 
the resource approaches total exhaustion. 
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Furthermore, the above study suggests that the initial fall in the resource price and the 
rapid rate of depletion is accentuated by a number of factors. The first occurs whenever 
the resource price is to some extent a function of its past price – something that is critical 
given that the extraction of many resource types requires the use of the resource being 
extracted (e.g., oil is invariably used to power the oil extraction process). The second 
involves the use of high discount rates, while the third occurs if governments, as they 
have a tendency to do, subsidise resource extraction industries in order to promote the 
growth of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
4 Evidence of ETR performances 
4.1 Previous assessments 
In this sub-section, I shall briefly reveal some of the evidence already obtained regarding 
the success or otherwise of ETR. A great deal of the work conducted on ETR has focused 
on simulation exercises designed to predict the likely outcome of various ETR measures 
(e.g., Felder and Schleiniger, 2002). Much less has involved the analysis of data to assess 
the efficacy of ETR measures previously implemented in various countries. 
Consequently, very little of the work has led to conclusive statements about the role and 
value of ETR. 
One of the most significant recent surveys on ETR was conducted by Bosquet (2000). 
The survey consisted of 56 studies of ex ante modelling exercises (i.e., simulation studies 
designed to predict the likely impact of ETR measures rather than ex post studies 
examining the actual economic and environmental impacts of ETR measures already 
imposed). On the whole, the simulation exercises predicted that ETR measures should 
lower carbon emissions, reduce the rate of energy use, and relieve environmental stress. 
Moreover, since CO2 emissions taxes and energy taxes have considerable revenue 
potential, it was anticipated that environmental taxes would allow governments to lighten 
the tax burden on personal income and on the employment of labour (Bosquet, 2000).5 
This, it seemed, provided widespread support for the ability of ETR to deliver the double 
dividend of ecological sustainability and low unemployment. 
Of course, one of the limitations of ex ante analyses is that simulation models ignore 
the role of dynamic efficiency, technological progress, and complex feedback processes. 
As such, their predictive power is highly questionable. In all, the success of any policy 
can only be ascertained via an ex post examination of relevant data. Unfortunately, 
ex post assessments of ETR are few in number. One such example is a study by Larsen 
and Nesbakken (1997) which claims that, from 1991 to 1993, carbon taxes assisted 
Norway to reduce carbon emissions from stationary sources in the manufacturing and 
service sectors by 3%–4%, with similar reductions observed in relation to household 
stationary and mobile sources.6 With the benefit of time, it can be revealed that Norway’s 
CO2 emissions rose significantly between 1993 and 1997 and were only tempered by 
the introduction of a new round of carbon taxes in 1999 (Statistics Norway various, 
1999–2002). Overall, Norway’s CO2 emissions increased by over 10% between 1990 and 
2002 (Statistics Norway various, 1999–2002). 
A study by the Swedish EPA (1997) also claims that Swedish ETR measures have 
reduced CO2 emissions. Regrettably, the Swedish EPA provides no quantitative estimate 
of the reductions. As we shall see in an upcoming section of the paper, Swedish ETR 
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measures in the mid-1990s were only successful in the short-term at reducing CO2 
emissions. Increases in real GDP after 1999 appeared to overwhelm the efficiency 
benefits induced by the Swedish ETR measures that, in turn, led to a rise in CO2 
emissions in each year from 2000 to 2003. 
The same has also occurred where ETR has been used to target other pollutants. 
Ekins (1999) has shown that a Swedish nitrogen oxide (NOx) tax announced in 1990 and 
imposed in 1992 led to massive reductions in NOx emission levels between 1990 and 
1995. However, by 2000, Swedish NOx emissions had risen by 23.1% on their 1995 
levels (WRI, various). Interestingly, most of the initial decline in NOx emissions between 
1990 and 1995 occurred in 1991, the year following the announcement of the tax. Hence, 
the announcement effect proved to be more powerful than the tax itself. 
In what appears to be an example of the Jevons’ effect, Ekins (1999) has also 
provided evidence of the impact of a 5% per annum increase in road fuel duties that was 
introduced by the UK Government in 1993. In 1995, petrol and diesel demand fell by 1% 
despite a rise in the volume of economic activity (as measured by real GDP). However, 
over the next two years, demand for petrol and diesel increased by 5%. The continuing 
rise in economic activity more than offset whatever efficiency gains were made such that 
increased road fuel duties could not prevent an eventual rise in petrol and diesel usage. 
This pattern has persisted in the UK where the use of road fuel continues to increase in 
the face of higher fuel taxes. 
4.2 Analysis of the ETR performances of Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, 
and Finland 
In this sub-section of the paper, the ETR measures of Sweden, Denmark, The 
Netherlands, and Finland are summarised as is the timing of their introduction. Empirical 
evidence is then provided in both tabulated and diagrammatical form with an assessment 
made of the impact of the respective ETR packages. 
4.2.1 Sweden 
Sweden first introduced ETR measures in 1991 that entailed a range of environmental 
taxes and levies such as an excise tax on CO2 emissions and a reduction in income tax 
rates. In 1993, following claims by energy-intensive industries that the 1991 measures 
were impacting on international competitiveness, the CO2 tax rate for industry and 
horticulture was significantly reduced (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). However, by 1997, 
and following a small rise in the CO2 tax rate in 1996, CO2 taxes were increased to just 
short of their 1991 rates. In addition, it was decided that CO2 tax rates should be adjusted 
to take account of inflation. This aside, fuels used for electricity generation remained 
exempt from CO2 taxes and other energy taxes, while many other energy-intensive 
industries continued to enjoy a cap on CO2 tax obligations provided their total CO2 tax 
impost exceeded 0.8% of sales (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). 
In 2001, the Swedish Government, in an attempt to quell the rise in CO2 and other 
emissions, decided to widen the scope of its environmental taxes. In addition, CO2 tax 
rates were further increased. These tax rises were matched by income tax rate reductions 
and a cut to employees’ social security contributions to the national pension fund. 
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Table 1 Ecological Tax Reform performance of Sweden, 1990–2004 
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Both the environmental and employment elements of Sweden’s ETR measures and the 
timing of both their introduction and modifications are summarised in Columns j and k of 
Table 1. The notes below the table indicate the exact nature of the tax rates. Columns a–h 
of Table 1 also reveal the various indicators relevant to Sweden’s ETR performance over 
the period 1990–2004. 
Figure 1, which is drawn from the data in Table 1, graphically illustrates both the 
CO2 emissions of Sweden (Column b of Table 1) and the ratio of Sweden’s real GDP to 
CO2 emissions (Column d of Table 1). Interestingly, the initial introduction of a CO2 tax 
did little to increase the efficiency ratio or reduce Sweden’s CO2 emissions. Only 
following the increases in CO2 tax rates in the mid- and late 1990s did the efficiency 
performance of Sweden improve. Nevertheless, it was short-lived. For example, between 
1996 and 2000, the ratio of Sweden’s real GDP to CO2 emissions rose steadily from 
33,680.6 SEK per tonne to 45,292.5 SEK per tonne – a 34.5% increase. This contributed 
to a decline in CO2 emissions over the same four-year period from 56.9 to 48.9 million 
tonnes – a 14.0% reduction. However, between 2000 and 2003, the ratio of Sweden’s real 
GDP to CO2 emissions remained almost unchanged (in fact, fell by 0.6%), while CO2 
emissions rose slightly from 48.9 million tonnes in 2000 to 51.6 million tonnes in 2003 
– a 5.4% increase. In 2004, the final year of the study period, the efficiency ratio 
jumped sharply (45,028.6 SEK per tonne to 47,747.3 SEK per tonne). Conversely, CO2 
emissions declined. 
Figure 1 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Sweden, 1990–2004 
Figure 2 again illustrates Sweden’s CO2 emissions and efficiency ratio except that the 
data in both cases are set to an index value of 100.0 for the first year of the study period 
(Columns c and e of Table 1). This provides a better demonstration of the trend change in 
both indicators as well as their comparative change in each year. It can be seen quite 
clearly from Figure 2 that both indicators moved in opposite directions in almost every 
year during the study period. This suggests that efficiency increases were able to 
reduce Sweden’s environmental stress. In other words, the ETR measures implemented 
by the Swedish Government appear to have prevented the scale impact of a growing 
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real GDP from entirely overwhelming the efficiency improvements induced. Having said 
this, the relative rise in the efficiency ratio over the study period was for more 
pronounced (+35.1%) than the overall fall in Sweden’s CO2 emissions (−2.4%). Given 
the small margins involved, it cannot be concluded that efficiency gains induced by ETR 
policy measures will prevent total CO2 emissions from rising in the future. However, 
neither can one conclude that the Jevons’ effect will eventually take hold as a result of the 
failure of depletion and pollution taxes to limit resource throughput to an ecologically 
sustainable rate. 
Figure 2 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Sweden, 1990–2004 (1990 = 100.0) 
As for the employment impact of Sweden’s ETR measures, such an assessment is more 
difficult to make. Between 1990 and 1993, employment numbers declined by over half a 
million while, during the same time, the unemployment rate jumped dramatically from 
1.8% to 9.6% (Figure 3 and Columns f and g from Table 1). With real GDP falling in 
each year between 1990 and 1993 (Column a in Table 1), this employment outcome can 
be attributed almost entirely to the early 1990s recession experienced in Sweden. 
Although Sweden’s real GDP rose from 1993 to 1997, the unemployment rate 
recovered only marginally over the same period (9.6% in 1993 and 9.1% in 1997). 
Beyond 1997 and until the new ETR measures in 2001, the unemployment rate fell 
rapidly to 4.2%. This is despite very modest increases in real GDP. Whether the 1997 
ETR measures were responsible for the apparent attractiveness of employing labour is 
difficult to conclude. 
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Figure 3 Employed persons and unemployment rate of Sweden, 1990–2004 
Unfortunately, and despite continued annual increases in real GDP to 2004, the 2001 
ETR measures appear to have overturned the attractiveness of labour with the 
unemployment rate at the end of the study period finishing at 5.6%. With employment 
numbers actually rising from 2001 to 2004, the income tax rate cuts of 2001 may have 
increased the labour force participation rate to such an extent that the net increase in 
available jobs was unable to keep pace with the rise in the number of people seeking 
employment. If this is the case, future ETR policies of the Swedish Government will need 
to do more to encourage people to exit the labour market. Failure of future ETR policies 
in this regard may result in a growing conflict between CO2 emissions objectives and the 
goal of low unemployment. 
4.2.2 Denmark 
Incentives to promote energy efficiency have long been a feature of the Danish taxation 
system (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). However, the ‘Energy Package’ introduced in the 
early 1990s involved not only a broader range of energy and emissions taxes, it included 
subsidies to encourage the development and uptake of resource-saving technologies and 
the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce social security contributions. 
As part of the Energy Package, a CO2 emissions tax was introduced in 1992, although 
the tax rate was halved for manufacturers in the following year because of fears that the 
initial tax rate of DKK 100 per metric tonne of CO2 emissions was affecting international 
competitiveness (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). Despite these concerns, energy tax rates 
were later increased and a host of new energy-based tax rates were introduced in 1996. 
The CO2 emissions tax rate, in particular, was increased in every year from 1996 to 2002. 
One of the main policy measures that enabled the Danish Government to allay fears 
concerning the increase in the CO2 emissions tax rate was the 1994 reduction of labour 
and income taxes. Indeed, with further modifications to income tax rates in 1997 and 
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1999 through to 2002, the Danish Government had shifted much of the tax based from 
earned income onto natural resource depletion and pollution – the very theoretical basis 
underpinning the concept of ETR (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). 
Columns j and k in Table 2 below summarise the environmental and employment 
elements of Denmark’s ETR measures as well as the timing of their introduction and 
subsequent modifications. As with Table 1 for Sweden, the notes below Table 2 spell out 
the exact nature of the tax rates in Denmark over the period 1990–2002. Columns a–h of 
Table 2 reveal the various indicators relevant to Denmark’s ETR performance over the 
study period. 
Denmark’s CO2 emissions (Column b of Table 2) and the ratio of Denmark’s real 
GDP to CO2 emissions (Column d of Table 2) are graphically illustrated in Figure 4 
below. Prior to the introduction of a CO2 tax in 1992, Denmark had experienced a 
significant rise in CO2 emissions and a sharp decline in its efficiency ratio (1990 to 
1991). While the initial CO2 tax imposition appeared to have a positive impact in terms of 
reducing emissions and increasing the efficiency ratio, the change to the CO2 tax rate 
in 1993 seems to have reversed this effect. For example, CO2 emissions increased from 
60.1 million tonnes in 1993 to 74.0 million tonnes in 1996 (a 23.3% rise), while the real 
GDP/CO2 emissions ratio declined from 15,514.0 DKK per tonne to 13,982.4 DKK per 
tonne over the same period (a 9.9% reduction). 
Following the increases in CO2 tax rates in 1996 and the subsequent annual increases 
to 2002, the ratio of Denmark’s real GDP to CO2 emissions increased by a dramatic 
55.3% between 1996 and 2000 (13,982.4 DKK per tonne to 21,719.2 DKK per tonne). 
The ratio declined slightly in 2001 but increased marginally in 2002. As one might 
probably expect, Denmark’s CO2 emissions fell sharply between 1996 and 2000 (74.0 
million tonnes down to 53.1 million tonnes). Emissions increased slightly in 2001 to 54.6 
million tonnes but effectively stabilised in 2002 (54.3 million tonnes). 
Figure 5 illustrates Denmark’s CO2 emissions and efficiency ratio with both 
indicators set in 1990 to an index value of 100.0 (Columns c and e of Table 2). The figure 
reveals that both indicators moved in opposite directions in every year during the study 
period. There is little doubt that efficiency improvements played a key role in whatever 
reductions in environmental stress Denmark secured during the 1990s. 
There are, however, two noteworthy aspects to consider. Firstly, during the 
‘efficiency boom’ of 1996–2000, the relative decline in CO2 emissions between 1996 and 
2002 (−26.7%) was not nearly as large as the rise in the real GDP to CO2 emissions ratio 
(+54.6%). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, total CO2 emissions increased by 
2.6% over the entire study period despite there being an overall efficiency increase of 
24.8%. Although the scale effect of a rising real GDP did not exceed the 1996–2000 
efficiency improvements induced by the more stringent ETR measures of the mid-1990s, 
it can be concluded that: (a) efficiency gains were becoming more difficult to secure 
towards the end of the study period (i.e., in 2001 and 2002), and (b) over the entire study 
period, the efficiency improvements were more than offset by the weight of increase in 
real GDP. In Denmark, at least, it would appear that the Jevons’ effect may have occurred 
as a consequence of conventional ETR measures being unable to limit the overall rate of 
resource throughput. 
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Table 2 Ecological tax reform performance of Denmark, 1990–2002 
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Figure 4 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Denmark, 1990–2002 
Figure 5 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Denmark, 1990–2002 (1990 = 100.0) 
Not unlike the Swedish case, the employment impact of Denmark’s ETR measures are 
inconclusive (see Figure 6). Similar to Sweden, Denmark also suffered a recession in the 
early 1990s, although less severe, which led to employment numbers falling and a 
resultant rise in the unemployment rate. However, because the unemployment rate was 
already high in 1990 at 9.7%, the rise to 12.4% by 1993 was smaller in magnitude than 
the Swedish case (Column g of Table 2). 
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Figure 6 Employed persons and unemployment rate of Denmark, 1990–2002 
From 1993 to the end of the study period, Denmark’s unemployment rate fell in each 
year. By 2002, it was down to 5.2%. In stark contrast to Sweden, the fall in the 
unemployment rate, particularly following the 1997 ETR measures, was accompanied by 
only a very small increase in employment numbers. Indeed, the unemployment rate 
declined in 1999 and remained steady in 2002 despite employment numbers falling 
slightly. This suggests that the Danish Government’s ETR policies have been more 
successful in reducing the labour force participation rate and increasing the attractiveness 
of employing labour. By doing so, the Danish approach may be averting the policy 
conflict between unemployment and environmental goals. 
4.2.3 The Netherlands 
Whilst a general fuel charge was first introduced in The Netherlands in 1988, it was not 
until 1992 that it was transformed by the Dutch Government into a general fuel tax as a 
means of collecting tax revenues on all fossil fuels (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this, fuels used as a raw material were exempted from the tax. 
Importantly, this meant that electricity remained tax-exempt although the energy 
resources used to generate electricity did not. 
As of 1 January 1996, a new approach to fuel taxes was adopted by the Dutch 
Government. Rather than having a general fuel tax, a regulatory tax was introduced. This 
new tax was specifically targeted to alter energy use behaviour, with the express aim of 
increasing the rate of energy efficiency in light of an apparent stagnation in efficiency 
advances in the first half of the 1990s (see real GDP/CO2 emissions ratio from 1990 to 
1996 in Table 3). 
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Table 3 Ecological tax reform performance of The Netherlands, 1990–2002 
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One of the key features of the new regulatory tax was its focus on small users of 
energy. The decision made by the Dutch Government to minimise the burden on large 
energy-intensive corporations was based on the understanding that: 
• the majority of large companies were already bound by agreements to adopt 
energy-saving measures 
• a unilateral CO2 emissions tax would adversely affect export competitiveness 
• large energy-intensive corporations were covered by the general fuel tax. 
Despite the focus on small energy users, the economic activities of 95% of all Dutch 
companies and individuals were covered by the regulatory fuel tax (Hoerner and 
Bosquet, 2001). 
Other important features of the 1996 ETR measures adopted by the Dutch 
Government were the reductions in the rate of employers’ social security contributions, 
the rise in the tax credit for the self-employed, the 3% cut in the corporate tax rate, and 
the 0.6% reduction in the personal income tax rate. Designed to be revenue-neutral, these 
measures ensured the 1996 ETR package incorporated both labour and income tax cuts. 
In order to complement the 1996 ETR measures, a 40% tax credit on corporate and 
personal income was introduced in 1997 for companies and individuals investing in 
energy-saving measures. A system of voluntary agreements to encourage additional 
resource-saving investments was also introduced, thereby allowing firms to choose 
their preferred depreciation schedule for environmental investments (Hoerner and 
Bosquet, 2001). 
Table 3 describes the nature and the timing of the environmental and employment 
elements of The Netherlands ETR policy (Columns j and k), while the various indicators 
in Columns a–h reveal the ETR performance of The Netherlands over the period 
1990–2002. The more precise details are again found in the notes below Table 3. 
Figure 7 graphically reveals both the CO2 emissions of The Netherlands (Column b of 
Table 3) and the ratio of its real GDP to CO2 emissions (Column d of Table 3). It can be 
clearly seen that, prior to the introduction of the regulatory fuel tax in 1996, the 1992 
transformation of the general fuel charge to a general fuel tax did little to increase the 
Dutch efficiency ratio (1,735.7 Euros per tonne of CO2 emissions in 1992 and 1,750.1 
Euros per tonne of CO2 emissions in 1996). The adoption of the general fuel tax also 
failed to drastically reduce CO2 emissions. To the contrary, emissions rose from 163.7 
million tonnes in 1992 to 178.3 million tonnes in 1996 – an 8.9% increase in just 
four years. 
Initially, at least, the 1996 introduction of the regulatory fuel tax appears to have 
had a positive impact on both the Dutch efficiency ratio and total CO2 emissions. 
Between 1996 and 1999, the efficiency ratio grew steadily from 1,750.1 to 2,072.4 Euros 
per tonne of CO2 emissions. At the same, total CO2 emissions fell from 178.3 to 169.2 
million tonnes. 
However, the potency of the regulatory fuel tax waned considerably after 1999. 
Whilst the efficiency ratio rose marginally in 2000, it fell in both 2001 and 2002. Not 
surprisingly, Dutch CO2 emissions increased from 1999 to 2002. Worse still, at 178.5 
million tonnes in 2002, CO2 emissions were slightly advanced of their 1996 peak. 
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The trend change in the efficiency ratio and CO2 emissions is starkly evidenced by the 
index values of both indicators presented in Figure 8 (also Columns c and e of Table 3). 
Although both indicators moved in opposite directions in most years during the study 
period, this was not the case during the short period prior to the introduction of the 
regulatory fuel tax in 1996. The same occurred following the apparent impotency of the 
tax after 1999. As a consequence, it was only during the rapid efficiency-advancing 
period of 1996–1999, following the imposition of the regulatory fuel tax, that efficiency 
increases reduced environmental stress levels in The Netherlands. 
Figure 7 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of The Netherlands, 1990–2002 
Figure 8 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of The Netherlands, 1990–2002 (1990 = 100.0) 
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Over the entire study period (1990–2002), the real GDP/CO2 emissions ratio increased by 
19.1% while Dutch CO2 emissions rose by 13.1%. Clearly, the scale impact of a rising 
real GDP completely overwhelmed the efficiency improvements induced by the ETR 
measures implemented by the Dutch Government. Moreover, something resembling the 
Jevons’ effect appears to have taken place after 1999. 
It should be noted, however, that the efficiency advances achieved in The Netherlands 
(+19.1%) were much lower than the gains experienced in both Sweden (+35.1%) and 
Denmark (+24.8%). As such, one might reasonably question whether the ETR measures 
introduced in The Netherlands were as potent and/or as appropriately targeted as those 
imposed in both Sweden and Denmark. Furthermore, it begs the question as to whether a 
better designed ETR package in The Netherlands might have increased efficiency levels 
sufficiently enough to have prevented the rise in Dutch CO2 emissions, particularly after 
1999. Thus, despite the strong evidential support for the ecological economic position on 
conventional ETR measures, the position is not conclusively proven in the Dutch case. 
The employment implications of the Dutch ETR measures are difficult to assess 
because of the lack of employment numbers for the period 1990–1995. This aside, Figure 
9 suggests that the Dutch unemployment rate was much less volatile than in Sweden and 
Denmark. In addition, the unemployment rate never reached the 1993 heights of 9.6% in 
Sweden and 12.4% in Denmark (note: the Dutch rate peaks at 6.9% in 1994). The lower 
unemployment rate in The Netherlands can be largely attributed to institutional factors 
and labour market programmes explicitly undertaken by the Dutch Government policy to 
keep unemployment as low as possible. 
Figure 9 and Column g in Table 3 indicate that the Dutch unemployment rate fell 
more sharply following the income tax rate cuts and the reduction in employers’ social 
security contributions in 1996. Indeed, without any additional rate of growth in real GDP 
from 1996 to 2001, the unemployment rate rapidly declined from 6.2% to 2.5%. It is also 
interesting to note that the real GDP/employment ratio of The Netherlands (Column h in 
Table 3) did not vary much between 1996 and 2002. There were, conversely, much 
greater increases in the real GDP/employment ratio for both Sweden and Denmark 
during this period (Column h in Tables 1 and 2). In a relative sense, this indicates that 
the employment elements of the Dutch ETR measures were better able to maintain if 
not increase the attractiveness of labour as real GDP continued to grow and as CO2 
emissions predominantly fell in the post-1996 period. In other words, there was a 
greater degree of substitution between labour and energy in The Netherlands than in 
Sweden and Denmark.7 
4.2.4 Finland 
In 1990, Finland became the first country to introduce an environmentally-motivated CO2 
tax. However, the tax was, until 1994, based entirely on a fuel’s carbon content. During 
the period 1994–1996, the Finnish Government varied the environmental component of 
the tax to reflect a fuel’s carbon and energy content (based on a 60:40 ratio). Except for 
electricity generation, this variation of the tax was reversed in 1997 (Hoerner and 
Bosquet, 2001). Nevertheless, the tax rate on the carbon content was increased 
significantly at the beginning of each year between 1996 and 1999 (from 14 FIM per 
tonne of CO2 emissions in 1996 to 102 FIM per tonne of CO2 emissions by 1999). 
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Figure 9 Employed persons and unemployment rate of The Netherlands, 1990–2004 
Finland’s tax shifting measures began to resemble the conventional ETR model in 1997 
following cuts to personal income tax rates and employers’ social security contributions. 
Following an agreement between private corporations and labour unions to limit 
wage rises in 1998 and 1999, the Finnish Government cut labour taxes by a further FIM 
1.5 billion in 1998 and FIM 3.5 billion in 1999 (Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). During 
these two years it was predicted that government tax revenues would decline by FIM 1.5 
billion and FIM 2.5 billion, respectively. As a consequence, the Finnish Government 
was able to allay the public fears of an increased tax burden by adopting a short-term 
budget-deficit approach in the knowledge that the deficit was likely to diminish in the 
medium- and long-term in response to increasing tax revenues brought about by rising 
employment levels. 
Columns j and k in Table 4 summarise the environmental and employment elements 
of Finland’s ETR. Columns a–h reveal the various indicators relevant to Finland’s 
ETR performance over the study period (1990–2002), while the precise nature of the 
ETR measures are explained in the notes below the table. 
Finland’s CO2 emissions (Column b of Table 4) and the ratio of Finland’s real GDP 
to CO2 emissions (Column d of Table 4) are graphically presented in Figure 10 below. 
Figure 10 shows that the CO2 tax introduced in 1990 and its modification in the 
mid-1990s had no positive effect on Finland’s efficiency ratio. Between 1990 and 1996, 
the real GDP/CO2 emissions ratio actually declined slightly from 1,539 to 1,413 Euros 
per tonne – an 8.2% fall. At the same time, total CO2 emissions rose from 70.5 million to 
76.9 million tonnes – a 9.1% increase. 
The more significant CO2 tax rate rises imposed between 1996 and 1999 triggered an 
immediate and dramatic reversal. Between 1996 and 2000, the real GDP/CO2 emissions 
ratio shot up by 33.3% from 1,413 to 1,884 Euros per tonne, while total CO2 emissions 
fell to 70.2 million tonnes – an 8.7% decrease over the four years and a level lower than 
that generated in 1990. Strangely, despite no change to the CO2 tax rate, the efficiency of 
resource use fell slightly in both 2001 and 2002. With real GDP still rising, CO2 
emissions increased beyond their 2000 levels to 77.3 million tonnes by the end of the 
study period. 
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Table 4 Ecological tax reform performance of Finland, 1990–2002 
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Figure 10 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Finland, 1990–2002 
Figure 11 graphically presents the index values of the efficiency ratio and CO2 emissions 
so as to reveal the trend change in both indicators (also Columns c and e of Table 4). In 
the very early stages (1990–1993), both indicators trend downwards – largely the 
consequence of a sharp recession experienced by Finland in the early 1990s. From this 
point until the end of the study period, both indicators moved in opposite directions. 
Overall, Finland’s CO2 emissions rose by 9.6% between 1990 and 2002. What’s more, 
Finland’s real GDP/CO2 emissions ratio increased by a mere 16.0%, the lowest of all the 
four countries examined in this paper. 
Figure 11 CO2 emissions and CO2 efficiency of Finland, 1990–2002 (1990 = 100.0) 
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Conclusions regarding the ecological economic position on conventional ETR measures 
are difficult to make in the Finnish case. This is because each of the years where 
Finland’s efficiency ratio increased, it was accompanied by a fall in Finland’s CO2 
emissions. However, efficiency gains were made in only six of the 12 years during the 
study period. Thus, while at no stage did the scale of economic activity in these six years 
more than offset the environmental stress-relieving impact of increased efficiency, the 
efficiency performance of Finland was weak over the study period. Of greater concern is 
the fact that the Finnish case constitutes a clear example of total CO2 emissions rising in 
the face of ETR policies designed to quell their increase. With this last point in mind, the 
evidence leans more strongly towards the Jevons’ effect having taken place in Finland 
than it having been averted. 
Consider, now, Figure 12 which shows the employment impact of the ETR measures 
introduced by the Finnish Government from 1995 to 2002. Due to a recession as severe in 
Finland as anywhere else in the industrial world, the unemployment rate reached 15.4% 
in 1995. By 2002, the unemployment rate had declined to 9.1% – still very high when 
compared to the other three counties examined in this paper. The fall in the 
unemployment rate can be mostly attributed to the recovery of the growth rate in real 
GDP from 1995 to 2002. Whilst the reduction in labour tax rates in 1997, 1998, and 
1999 may have had a positive impact on the unemployment rate and the attractiveness 
of labour, this certainly cannot be concluded from a casual observation of the data in 
Table 4. If anything, the employment elements of Finland’s ETR measures appear to 
have had very little impact given that the real GDP/employment ratio increased at about 
the same rate before and after the policies were implemented. 
Figure 12 Employed persons and unemployment rate of Finland, 1995–2002 
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4.3 Comments on the evidence 
When the evidence of all four countries is drawn together, a relatively clear and 
uniform picture emerges. It is one which reveals that conventional ETR measures – i.e., 
taxes on pollution rather than quantitative throughput controls – led to greater efficiency 
and lower CO2 emissions, but only in the short-term. Whether it be the consequence of 
diminishing efficiency advances or the scale impact of increased economic activity, 
conventional ETR measures failed to prevent CO2 emissions from eventually rising. 
Worse still, the CO2 emissions of Finland and the Netherlands were significantly higher 
at the end of the study period than they were at the beginning. Only in Sweden did CO2 
emissions fall but, as previously highlighted, the decline was a meagre 2.4%. One can 
therefore conclude that the Jevons’ effect generally took place within three to four years 
of the introduction of ETR.  
The employment impact of the tax cuts to labour and income was much less 
conclusive. About all that can be said about the employment elements of the respective 
ETR packages was that: (a) the possible tension between the policy goals of ecological 
sustainability and low unemployment might be far less in Denmark than elsewhere, and 
(b) some limited degree of substitutability between labour and energy may have occurred 
in The Netherlands. 
In summary, the evidence provided in this paper supports the ecological economic 
position that conventional ETR measures cannot achieve the double dividend of 
ecological sustainability and low unemployment. However, the support remains 
cautionary for a number of reasons. Firstly, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper 
is based on casual observation of the data presented. The inferences made are not based 
on rigorous statistical tests.8 Secondly, it has been assumed that the impact of the 
introduced policy measures is immediate rather than lagged. Clearly, the duration it takes 
for ETR policies to impact fully on the economy is a crucial consideration when judging 
their success or failure. Having said this, the apparent impotency of the ETR measures 
some three to four years following their imposition suggests that any lagged effect could 
be negative rather than positive, although it is possible that the policy lag could be a 
decade or more. 
Thirdly, the potential influence of exogenous factors have been overlooked or 
ignored. There is little doubt that international forces, domestic institutional factors, and 
government decisions in other policy demains can greatly effect the environmental and 
employment outcomes of a particular country (Bosquet, 2000). It is conceivable that one 
or more of these factors may have contributed to the medium-term failure of the 
conventional ETR measures introduced and not the lack of quantitative throughput 
controls recommended by many ecological economists. 
Finally, it is possible that the ETR measures imposed in all four countries were 
innocuous or inappropriately targeted. If so, it still leaves open the possibility that better 
devised ETR policies of the conventional kind could achieve the double dividend of 
ecological sustainability and low unemployment. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
Despite considerable benefits arising from the ETR packages implemented in Sweden, 
Denmark, The Netherlands, and Finland, their success in terms of reducing CO2 
emissions appear to have been short-lived. Whilst the ETR packages may have had a 
positive employment effect, the ultimate success of ETR is likely to depend, as some 
ecological economists believe, on ‘cap and trade’ systems that involve the use of 
tradeable resource use and pollution permits. 
From the point of view of CO2 emissions and their contribution to global climate 
change, there would appear to be an urgent need to go beyond carbon taxes and 
establish carbon trading systems at both the intra- and international levels. Recent 
statements by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the introduction of carbon 
trading initiatives in the US state of California and the Australian states of New South 
Wales, Victoria, and South Australia are all positive developments. Above all, however, 
appropriate responses must not continue to be corrupted by mainstream economic 
arguments that allocative efficiency – facilitated by the internalisation of environmental 
spillover costs into market prices (i.e., conventional ETR measures) – can deliver 
sustainable environmental outcomes and, therefore, the double dividend of ecological 
sustainability and low unemployment. 
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Notes 
1 A more detailed description of a system of tradeable resource use permits can be found in 
Lawn (forthcoming). 
2 It is the constrained supply forces that ensures ecological limits are internalised into 
resource prices. 
3 Of course, whether permit systems achieve ecological sustainability still depends on the rate of 
throughput being within the regenerative and waste assimilative capacities of the natural 
environment which, moreover, depends upon the human capacity to determine such a rate and 
auctioning the appropriate number of permits. Should the sustainable rate of throughput be 
overestimated and too many permits are auctioned, ecological sustainability will not be 
achieved. Since the natural environment is a complex system whereby exact knowledge of the 
sustainable limit is infeasible, a precautionary approach should be adopted. That is, for 
example, the number of permits auctioned should approximate around 75% of the estimated 
sustainable rate of throughput. 
4 To understand what is meant by low and high entropy matter-energy, the importance of the 
first and second laws of thermodynamics must be revealed. The first law of thermodynamics is 
the law of conservation of energy and matter. It declares that energy and matter can never be 
created or destroyed. The second law is the Entropy Law. It declares that whenever energy is 
used in physical transformation processes, the amount of usable or ‘available’ energy always 
declines. While the first law ensures the maintenance of a given quantity of energy and matter, 
the Entropy Law determines that which is usable. This is critical since, from a physical 
viewpoint, it is not the total quantity of matter-energy that is of primary concern, but the 
amount that exists in a readily available form. 
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The best way to illustrate the relevance of these two laws is to provide a simple example. 
Consider a piece of coal. When it is burned, the matter-energy embodied within the coal is 
transformed into heat and ash. While the first law ensures the total amount of matter-energy in 
the heat and ashes equals that previously embodied in the piece of coal, the second law 
ensures the usable quantity of matter-energy does not. In other words, the dispersed heat and 
ashes can no longer be used in a way similar to the original piece of coal. To make matters 
worse, any attempt to reconcentrate the dispersed matter-energy, which requires the input of 
additional energy, results in more usable energy being expended than that reconcentrated. 
Hence, all physical transformation processes involve an irrevocable loss of available energy or 
what is sometimes referred to as a ‘net entropy deficit’. This enables one to understand the use 
of the term low entropy and to distinguish it from high entropy. Low entropy refers to a highly 
ordered physical structure embodying energy and matter in a readily available form, such as a 
piece of coal. Conversely, high entropy refers to a highly disordered and degraded physical 
structure embodying energy and matter that is, by itself, in an unusable or unavailable from, 
such as heat and ash. By definition, the matter-energy used in economic processes can be 
considered low entropy resources whereas unusable by-products can be considered high 
entropy wastes. 
5 For those interested in a few of the more elaborate simulation exercises, see Goulder (1995), 
Cansier and Krumm (1997), Tindale and Holtham (1996), Baron et al. (1996), and Harrison 
and Kriström (1999). 
6 Stationary sources in the manufacturing and services sectors along with stationary and mobile 
sources in the case of households represents approximately 40% of Norway’s CO2 emissions. 
7 There is, nonetheless, a severe limit on the substitutability of labour for energy. To understand 
why, see Lawn (2003). 
8 Rigorous statistical analysis of the impact of ETR is the subject of my current research in this 
area. More conclusive results can be expected in the forseeable future. 
